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1.  Introduction  
The dominant trait of current procedures for measuring unemployment, and, broadly, labour force 
participation, is emphasis on the conventional guidelines recommended by the International Labour 
Office in general terms (ILO, 1983; Hussmans, Merhan and Verma, 1990) and made operational by 
national statistical agencies to fit specific country contexts (see, e.g., Sorrentino, 2000). Essentially, 
the definition of unemployment is based on three criteria to be satisfied simultaneously. People 
above a specific age are considered unemployed if, during the reference period ￿ generally one 
week, they were (i) without work, (ii) currently available for work, and (iii) actively seeking work. 
While this measurement strategy is deemed to be reasonably satisfactory for purposes of 
consistent comparisons across space and over time, it does suffer from definite limitations. Some of 
the basic difficulties depend on the fact that it is much harder to measure ￿the hole [of 
unemployment] rather than the doughnut [of employment]￿, as Shiskin (1976) pointed out now 
more than twenty-five years ago. Recent trends in the economies of developed countries have 
stressed these difficulties. The spectrum of situations in the labour market has become more 
diversified, and situations to the boundaries between the usual labour force states have expanded
1. 
Various approaches have been proposed to deal with the issue
2. First, one can take the 
￿building block approach￿ suggested by ILO (1980)
3: aggregates of interest are evaluated by adding 
to or removing from a reference aggregate particular sub-sets of people, according to variations in 
definitions
4. A second method centres on the salience of the distinction among labour force states, 
which is assessed by looking at the similarities or differences among the various groups in terms of 
their probability of transition to employment (Flinn & Heckman, 1983; Jones & Riddell, 1999). A 
third route consists of complementing current measures of unemployment with investigations on the 
informational value of job search data ￿ job search methods, intensity, etc. ￿ and on the impact of 
job search behaviour on the probability of subsequent employment (see, e.g., Osberg, 1993; 
Micklewright & Nagy, 1999; B￿heim & Taylor, 2001). 
This paper takes a route similar to the last one, and has a definite aim: to construct an 
indicator of ￿choosiness￿ of the supply of job-seekers, moving from the set of questions about job 
search and work preferences typically included in a Labour Force Survey (LFS).  
In LFSs, it is common practice to add to the questions on job search strictly required for 
identifying the unemployed further questions on the conditions of labour supply: willingness to 
move; availability with respect to temporary or atypical jobs; minimum acceptable wage; etc.. Our 
purpose is to exploit the set of questions about search/availability/preferences for work, in order to 









1 For a discussion of some ￿grey areas￿ between employment, unemployment and inactivity, relevant for analytical and 
policy purposes, see Malinvaud (1986), who considers four somewhat ambiguous domains: visible under-employment, 
training-employment, pre-retirement, and discouraged workers. 
2 We refer here to approaches which apply to micro-data on individuals, and are essentially classificatory or at most 
involve some reduced-form modelling.  
3 Indeed, the suggestion of a set of alternative unemployment indicators, known as the U-1 to U-7 framework, goes 
back to Shiskin (1976). It is still in use at the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
4 An interesting case study applied to Italy is by Rossi (1997).   2
build up indicators summarizing information on the choosiness of job-seekers, at various levels of 
aggregation ￿ from individual level up to the entire group of job-seekers
5.  
It should be emphasized at the outset that the degree of choosiness of the labour supply of 
job-seekers is not observable, and that available proxies are often endogenous to the labour market 
(dis)equilibrium process to be explained. Thus, our contribution must be viewed as an exploratory 
exercise for obtaining descriptive indicators of choosiness. Our method relies on results from 
Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA), and is presented and discussed in some detail. Empirical 
analyses on cross-section and panel samples of job-seekers from the Italian quarterly Labour Force 
Survey (ILFS) help to clarify the main points, and the potentials and limitations of the approach.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we describe the data used and motivate 
the choice for MCA (Section 2). Then we focus on the basic, preliminary issue: does the pattern of 
the data on search/availability/preferences for work suggest that there is a factor which may be 
sensibly interpreted in terms of choosiness of job-seekers? The evidence is positive (Section 3). 
Based on that, we present the method for obtaining the indicator of choosiness, first at individual 
level and then at aggregate levels (Section 4). We proceed to investigate the informational value of 
the indicator, by examining its stability over time and its predictive power on labour force 
transitions. The measurement properties of the indicator, as assessed by its profile over the panels, 
turn out to be quite satisfactory. As regards gross flows from unemployment, results include some 
seemingly striking findings ￿ among unemployed, the less choosy have a probability of transition to 
employment lower than the more choosy ones. A sensible way of rationalizing these findings is to 
point to unobserved heterogeneity and, chiefly, to endogeneity (Section 5). Finally, we present and 
briefly comment selected results for Italy. We conclude with some suggestions for using the 
indicator properly for comparisons across space and over time (Section 6). 
 
 
2.  Data and methods 
For all persons who state that they are seeking work, the questionnaire of the ILFS includes a series 
of questions dealing with: (i) intensity of job search (number and type of search actions); (ii) 
immediate availability for work; (iii) availability or preferences with respect to type of job, working 
time regime, and place of work; (iv) minimum acceptable wage (conditional on the preferences 
given above); (v) ongoing duration of search; (vi) registration at the Labour Exchange Office; (vii) 
recipiency of unemployment insurance or benefits. 
We derived ten variables from these questions. They are described in Table 1, which is self-
explanatory. Categorization of the variables entailed some subjective judgements ￿ obviously, 
except for the case when the variables were originally dichotomous. The guideline was to choose a 
small number of categories for each variable, in order to give them a well-balanced role in 
accounting for the variance in multiple correspondence analysis. Note also that, within each 
variable, the ordering of categories was taken to be consistent with a (presumed) increasing degree 
of choosiness. 
  Some clarifications are immediately in order, to motivate the choice to use multiple 
correspondence analysis in building up a summary indicator of choosiness. First of all, it is worth 
noting that, in our opinion, it would be improper to use just the question on minimum net monthly 
wage. Indeed, prima facie it might appear that answers to this question can be taken as a proxy for 
the reservation wage: a straight, theory-based indicator of choosiness. Unfortunately, this is not the 
case. The question on minimum net monthly wage is conditional upon the set of questions on 
availability/preferences with respect to type of job, working time regime, and place of work: 
therefore,  answers to it cannot be interpreted  as the reservation wage.  What is more,  the format of  
                                                           
5 Note that this line of attack has some clear analogies with efforts made at the OECD, in the context of cross-country 
comparisons, to produce summary indicators of employment protection legislation and product market regulation. See 
Grubb & Wells (1993), OECD (1994) and Nicoletti, Scarpetta & Boylaud (1999).   3
 
Table 1: Variables used and their categorization for multiple correspondence analysis 
Codes  Variables considered for multiple correspondence analysis (i.e., questions from 
ILFS questionnaire) and description of categories 
TYP  Types of job search actions carried out within last 30 days(Q. 47)  
Typ1 Otherwise 
Typ2  Only for a job as employee in private sector 
AVA  “Would you be immediately available for work?” (Q. 50) 
Ava1  Yes, in any conditions 
Ava2  Yes, in adequate conditions 
Ava3 No 
JOB  “What type of job you are mainly looking for?”(Q. 51) 
Job1 Otherwise 
Job2  As employee with a long-term contract 
TIM  “At what working time regime would you be willing to work?” (Q. 52) 
Tim1  Any working time 
Tim2  Preferably full-time or preferably part-time 
Tim3  Only full-time or only part-time 
PLA  “Where would you be willing to work?”(Q. 53) 
Pla1 Otherwise 
Pla2  In town of residence or any other town within daily commuting distance 
WAG  “What is the minimum net monthly wage at which you would be willing to work, 
given the type of job, working time and place of work indicated above?” (Q. 54) 
Wag1  Net monthly wages less than It. Lire 1,500,000 (Euro 775) 
Wag2  Net monthly wage between 1,500,000 and 1,700,000 It. Lire (Euro 775-878) 
Wag3  Net monthly wage no less than It. Lire 1,700,000 (Euro 878) 
REG  “Are you registered at the Labour Exchange Office?” (Q. 56) 
Reg1 Yes 
Reg2 No 
DUR  “How long have you been looking for a job?”(Q. 46) 
Dur1 0-11  months 
Dur2 12-23  months 
Dur3  24 months or more  
NUM  Number of job search actions carried out within last 30 days (from Q. 47) 
Num1  More than 1 
Num2 1 
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the question ￿ open answer, with no precise reference to the number of hours of work (and other 
working arrangements) ￿ is definitely far from the stringent prescriptions of contingent valuation to 
assess appropriately the economic value of non-market goods ￿ in our case, leisure (Hausman, 
1993; Bateman & Wallis, 1995)
6. 
In broader terms, we should also consider that household survey data are affected by several 
sources of non-response and imprecision, which result in sizeable measurement errors (see Bound, 
Brown & Mathiowetz, 2001, for a comprehensive review). Furthermore, measurement errors are 
likely to be higher for questions that are not the core ones of a survey. In LFSs, this is precisely the 
case for questions about search/availability/preferences for work not required to identify the 
unemployed
7. Provided we have multiple indicators, a multivariate exploratory approach is well 
suited to deal with such imprecise information.  
Lastly, we must explain the reason for choosing MCA, as opposed to the alternative 
approach based on factor analysis, adopted, for example, by Nicoletti, Scarpetta & Boylau (1999) 
for constructing the OECD￿s summary indicators of labour market regulation. The reason is 
straightforward: MCA does not require a continuous metric for observed variables. Thus, it is 
consistent with the scale of available information, which is in fact qualitative: it saves us from 
carrying out a questionable transformation of variables and provides us with robust findings. 
As for the data sets for empirical analyses, they consist of three cross-section samples from 
the 1997.IV, 1998.I and 1998.IV survey occasions of  the ILFS,  and of two  two-wave panels  
constructed from them ￿ 1997.IV-1988.I  and 1997.IV-1998.IV
8. 
The three cross-section samples are made up of persons who reported they were looking for 
a job and actively seeking work −  in the sense that they had taken at least one step to seek work 
within the previous 30 days. We will call them simply ￿job-seekers￿. They consist of 11-12,000 
individuals. 
The two panels consist of persons who were continuous job-seekers. They were extracted 
from the overall 1997.IV-1998.I and 1997.IV-1998.IV panels
9 respectively, and contain individuals 
who reported that they were (i) job-seekers on both survey occasions and (ii) continuously looking 
for a job during the period separating them ￿ three months and twelve months respectively
10. The 
rationale for this choice was to have a data set suitable for stability analysis, i.e., for assessing the 
consistency of the measures of interest ￿ the individual indicator of choosiness and the survey 
variables used to construct it ￿ over the same persons, experiencing roughly the same labour force 
condition, on two subsequent survey occasions. Patently, when interpreting the results, we must 
take into account the fact that the panels are affected by a selection process, shaped by the very 
same condition of having been continuously looking for a job: the longer the interval between 
survey occasions, the stronger the selection. The 1997.IV-1998.I panel ￿ or ￿quarterly panel￿, as we 
also call it ￿ comprises 3,223 job-seekers, whereas the 1997.IV-1998.IV panel ￿ or ￿yearly panel￿ ￿ 
is reduced to 1,592 individuals
11.  
                                                           
6 For attempts at estimating the reservation wage from IFLS data via a modelling approach, see Mazzotta (1998) and 
Boeri & Garibaldi (2000). Precisely due to the methodological weaknesses of the survey instrument, we find these 
attempts problematic and their results dubious. 
7 These questions may be perceived as secondary, and handled more loosely, by interviewers and also by respondents. 
8 The ILFS is a quarterly survey with a 2-2-2 rotating panel design (see, e.g., Trivellato, 1997). 
9 Panels were obtained using the record linkage procedure by Paggiaro & Torelli (2000).  
10 Operationally, we assessed the latter condition mainly on the basis of the answers to the question on duration of 
search. For the 1997.IV-1998.I panel, on the second occasion job-seekers had to report a duration of search ≥ 3 months. 
In the 1997.IV-1998.IV panel, on the 1998.IV occasion job-seekers had to report a duration of search ≥ 12 months; 
besides, they had to have reported that they were job-seekers at the intermediate survey occasion at which they were 
also interviewed (given the design of  the ILFS, 1998.I for roughly half the panel and 1998.III for the remaining half). 
11 Given the 2-2-2 rotating panel design of the ILFS, in the absence of the condition of continuous job search, one 
would have expected the quarterly and yearly panels to be roughly of the same size, i.e., 50% of the initial cross-section 
sample (apart from attrition, arguably stronger for the yearly panel).   5
Descriptive statistics are given in Table 2. Let us look first at the data on cross-section 
samples. The large majority of job seekers, 81% or more, are unemployed ￿ more precisely, 31-
33% are unemployed job losers, 34% are seeking their first job, and 15-16% are ￿others seeking a 
job￿
12; 16-17% are employed but seeking a different job; 1-2% are persons classified as out of the 
labour force. Of the panel samples, the number of people continuously unemployed grows 
appreciably, to 85% for the quarterly panel and to 89% for the yearly panel ￿ the increase being 
concentrated on first job seekers (up to 47% in the yearly panel), contrasted by a decrease in the 
number of job losers (down to 29% in the yearly panel). Employed job-seekers drop to 14% and 
10% respectively, and persons not in the labour force stay around 1%. 
The distribution of job-seekers by the ten variables on search/availability/preferences for 
work is given in Table 3
13. Of these variables, it is important to remark that just seven are used in 
final multiple correspondence analysis. Three variables were discarded, either because of their 
ambiguous meaning with respect to the latent dimension of interest ￿ choosiness ￿ or because their 
empirical distribution was too highly polarized, thus precluded meaningful use in the context of 
MCA
14. The variables discarded were:  
(a) DUR, i.e., the variable resulting from the question ￿How long have you been looking for a 
job?￿. This variable has a particularly dubious relationship with choosiness: coeteris paribus, 
one would expect the more choosy job-seekers to search longer; on the other hand, coeteris 
paribus, one would also expect that the longer the ongoing duration of a spell of job search, the 
lower the choosiness. Indeed, DUR is essentially endogenous to the search process.   
(b) NUM, i.e., the variable ￿Number of job search actions carried out within the last 30 days￿. The 
meaning of this variable too is ambiguous. In addition, it has answers heavily concentrated on a 
small number of types of actions.  
(c) BEN, i.e., the variable associated with the question ￿Do you receive unemployment insurance or 
benefits?￿. This exclusion is seemingly incongruous, given the well-established importance of 
unemployment benefits in influencing job search behaviour in developed economies. One 
should consider, however, that the variable is largely dominated by the answer no: a reflection 
of the limited role played by unemployment benefits within the Italian welfare system (Bertola 
et al., 2000)





                                                           
12 These are individuals who, to an initial question about their labour force state did not identify themselves as 
unemployed, but from subsequent questions turned out to report seeking behaviour consistent with the definition of 
unemployment. 
13 There were some missing data to the question ￿What is the minimum net monthly wage at which you would be 
willing to work?￿: 238 (2.12%) in 1997.IV, 236 (2.14%) in 1998.I and 207 (1.73%) in 1998.IV. A within-cell hot deck 
imputation was performed, based on the results of logit regressions. The predictors retained were: region of residence 
(North/Other); occupational status (Employed/Other); preferred working time regime (Only or preferably full-
time/Other); registration at the Labour Exchange Office (Yes/No).  
14 Results from a series of MCA, carried out on the entire set of ten variables and on various combinations of nine or 
eight of them, support the choice to restrict final correspondence analysis to the set of seven variables. Indeed, results 
do not vary appreciably when the set of variables involved is changed. As an example, for the 1997.IV sample, the 
portion of variance explained by the first factor ranges from 17.5% (with seven variables) to 12.9% (with ten variables), 
and the coordinates of the categories of the seven variables do not exhibit noticeable changes. 
15 For the period covered by our analyses, the only recipients of unemployment benefits were unemployed individuals 
with previous work experience: their replacement ratio was quite low, close to 30% of their previous pay. Unemployed 
individuals looking for their first job drew no benefits at all.   6
 
Table 2: Job-seekers by gender and labour force state, 1997.IV, 1998.I, 1998.IV, panels 1997.IV-
1998.I and 1997.IV-1998.IV (samples) 















1997.IV Males  N  1,034  2,061 1,863  232  4,156 84  5,274 
   % 19.6 39.1 35.3 4.4  78.8 1.6  100.0 
 Females  N  793  1,539 2,002  1,504  5,045 107  5,945 
   % 13.3 25.9 33.7  25.3  84.9 1.8  100.0 
 Total  N  1,827  3,600 3,865  1,736  9,201 191  11,129 
   % 16.3 32.1 34.4  15.5  82.0 1.7  100.0 
1998.I Males  N  942 2,133 1,888  221  4,242 72  5,256 
   % 17.9 40.6 35.9 4.2  80.7 1.4  100.0 
 Females  N  776  1,555 1,878  1,438  4,871 100  5,747 
   % 13.5 27.1 32.7  25.0  84.8 1.7  100.0 
 Total  N  1,718  3,688 3,766  1,659  9,113 172  11,003 
   % 15.6 33.5 34.2  15.1  82.8 1.6  100.0 
1998.IV Males  N  1,094  2,180 2,012  261  4,453 91  5,638 
   % 19.4 38.7 35.7 4.6  79.0 1.6  100.0 
 Females  N  981  1,551 2,083  1,624  5,258 107  6,346 
   % 15.5 24.4 32.8  25.6  82.8 1.7  100.0 
 Total  N  2,075  3,731 4,095  1,885  9,711 198  11,984 
   % 17.3 31.1 34.2  15.7  81.0 1.7  100.0 
Quarterly   Males  N  240  597 587 60  1,244 15  1,499 
panel*   % 16.0 39.8 39.2 4.0  83.0 1.0  100.0 
 Females  N  196  465 670  369  1,504 24  1,724 
   %  11.3  27.0 39.0  21.4  87.4 1.3  100.0 
 Total  N  436  1,062 1,257  429  2,748 39  3,223 
   % 13.6 32.9 39.0  13.3  85.2 1.2  100.0 
Yearly Males  N  86  273 374 21  668 4  758 
panel**   % 11.4 36.0 49.3 2.8  88.1 0.5  100.0 
 Females  N  70  192 370  189  751 13  834 
   % 8.4  23.0 44.4  22.7  80.1 1.5  100.0 
 Total  N  156  465 744  210  1,419 17  1,592 
   % 9.8  29.2 46.7  13.2  89.1 1.1  100.0 
*  Job-seekers on both survey occasions and continuously looking for a job during the quarter separating them, from the 
1997.IV-1998.I panel. 
 ** Job-seekers on both survey occasions and continuously looking for a job during the year separating them, from the 
1997.IV-1998.IV panel.   7
Table 3: Distribution of job-seekers by variables used in multiple correspondence analysis, 
1997.IV, 1998.I, 1998.IV, and panels 1998.IV-1998.I and 1997.IV-1998.IV 
Variable 1997.IV  1998.I  1998.IV  Quarterly panel   Yearly panel 
        N  %        N  %       N  %       N  %        N  %
TYP   Typ1  2,872  25.6  2,665  24.2 3,192 26.6 669 20.8  369 23.2
          Typ2  8,347  74.4  8,338  75.8 8,792 73.4 2,554 79.2  1,223 76.8
AVA   Ava1  4,092  36.58  4,073  37.0 4,138 34.5 1,245 38.6  694 43.6
         Ava2  6,698  59.7  6,532  59.4 7,377 61.6 1,898 58.9  867 54.5
         Ava3  429  3.8  398  3.6 469 3.9 80 2.5  31 1.9
JOB    Job1 4,347 38.7  4,393  39.9 4,631 38.6 1,304 40.5  692 43.5
         Job2  6,872  61.3  6,610  60.1 7,353 61.4 1,919 59.5  900 56.5
TIM    Tim1 2,541  22.6  2,473  22.5 2,691 22.5 775 24.0  467 29.3
          Tim2  4,686  41.8  4,657  42.3 5,140 42.9 1,334 41.4  666 41.8
         Tim3  3,992  35.6  3,873  35.2 4,153 34.7 1,114 34.6  459 28.8
PLA     Pla1 2,535  22.6  2,416  22.0 2,752 23.0 741 23.0  388 24.4
           Pla2  8,684  77.4  8,587  78.0 9,232 77.0 2,482 77.0  1,204 75.6
WAG Wag1 3,373  30.1  3,359  30.5 3,393 28.3 964 29.9  454 28.5
         Wag2  4,358  38.8  4,221  38.4 3,843 32.1 1,182 36.7  543 34.1
         Wag3  3,488  31.1  3,423  31.1 4,748 39.6 1,077 33.4  595 37.4
REG   Reg1 8,600  76.7  8,506  77.3 9,338 77.9 2,585 80.2  1,361 85.5
         Reg2  2,619  23.3  2,497  22.7 2,646 22.1 638 19.8  231 14.5
NUM Num1 5,583  49.8  5,591  50.8 5,301 44.2 1,745 54.1  827 51.9
         Num2  5,636  50.2  5,412  49.2 6,683 55.8 1,478 45.9  765 48.1
DUR   Dur1 3,552  31.7  3,576  32.5 3,777 31.5 775 24.0  0 0
          Dur2  2,282    20.3  2,151  19.5 2,244 18.7 676 21.0  349 21.9
          Dur3  5,385     48.0  5,276  48.0 5,963 49.8 1,772 55.0  1,243 78.1
BEN   Ben1 559 5.0  665  6.0 565 4.7 134 4.2  25 1.6
         Ben2  10,660  95.0  10,338  49.2 11,419 95.3 3,089 95.8  1,567 98.4
Total   11,219  100.0  11,003  100.0 11,984 100.0 3,223 100.0  1,592 100.0
 
3.  Is there a factor which may be interpreted in terms of choosiness? Evidence from multiple 
correspondence analysis  
 
3.1. Multiple correspondence analysis: some essential notes 
MCA is a descriptive statistical technique that simultaneously represents a set of qualitative 
variables in a space of reduced dimensionality. Broadly speaking, it may be viewed as the 
analogueof principal components analysis when the measurements are categorical instead of 
continuous. To make the paper self-contained, we summarize here some basic features of MCA (for 
details, see Lebart, Morineau & Warwick, 1984, and Greenacre & Blasius, 1994).  
MCA consists of the search for underlying factors in the data, by computing the eigenvalues 
and eigenvectors of a transformation of the original nxp data matrix, where n is the number of units 
and p is the total number of mutually exclusive categories of the set of qualitative variables under 
consideration. The result is the representation of p categories in a factorial space of smaller   8
dimension, the axes of the factorial space ￿ or factors, as they are also called ￿ being linear 
combinations of the categories themselves. The factors are ordered from largest to smallest, 
according to the portion of total variance accounted for by each of them. 
The results of an MCA are summarized by the following quantities: (i) factorial coordinates, 
i.e., coordinates giving the position of each category with respect to the factors
16; (ii) absolute 
contributions, which indicate the (￿) proportion of variance explained by each category in relation 
to each factor
17; (iii) relative contributions, which indicate the part of the variance of a category 
explained by a factor. They are also typically presented on graphs which represent configurations of 
points (i.e., categories) in projection planes formed by the first factors
18. 
To interpret the results of an MCA, we must take into account both points with larger 
absolute contributions and points with better relative contributions, which are likely to be far distant 
from the origin of the axes. The former are the categories which better explain the factor under 
consideration; the latter are the categories better explained by that factor. Thus, it is easily possible 
for a category to contribute poorly to the building of a factor, but, in spite of this, to be highly 
correlated with that same factor. The points close to the origin of the axes neither characterize nor 
are characterized by the factors themselves: they have undifferentiated distribution among the units, 
and consequently little informative value. 
Moreover, results may often be better interpreted by adding supplementary variables to the 
so-called active variables ￿ i.e., the variables directly used in MCA for computing the factors. The 
points (i.e., categories) corresponding to these supplementary variables are also positioned on the 
factorial plane, and may shed some light in interpreting the factors.  
 
3.2. The first factor interpreted in terms of choosiness 
The issue to be addressed is whether the results of MCA allow us to detect a factor which may be 
sensibly interpreted in terms of choosiness.  
First, we need to ascertain if such a factor can be recognized, in the sense that the categories 
of all the active variables take on factorial coordinates consistent with ranking along a 
flexibility/choosiness axis. Such a factor should possibly be among the first ones; in other words, it 
should explain an appreciable portion of total variance. 
Table 4 and Figure 1 present the results for the 1997.IV sample. The first factor accounts for 
17.5% of total variance and can definitively be interpreted as an axis going from flexibility to 
choosiness. Quite similar results were obtained for the 1998.I and 1998.IV samples and for the two 
panels of continuous job-seekers
19. They provide prima facie evidence of the robustness of our 
findings.  
Looking at the MCA results more closely, two points are worth noting. First, the variables 
are quite dispersed, so that a considerable number of factors is needed to account for their variance: 
the first four factors account for only 53.9% of the variance (the fourth factor contributes 10.6%), 
and the tenth factor still explains 5%. Hence, it is reasonable to acknowledge that, in addition to the 
dimension of choosiness represented by the first factor, other appreciable latent dimensions ￿ and 
conceivably also sizeable noise ￿ underline the variability of survey responses to the questions 
about search/availability/preferences for work. 
                                                           
16 Note that factorial coordinates are invariant with respect to axis translations. 
17 The absolute contributions of the categories of a given variable may be summed up, thus giving the overall 
contribution of the variable to the variance of the factor. 
18 In this representation, the relative contribution of a category depends on the angle between the vector which 
represents that category and the relevant axis. The smaller the angle, the more the category is correlated with the factor. 
19 Detailed results are available from the authors on request. In summary, the portion of variance explained by the first 
factor stays within the range 17.3-17.5%; the factorial coordinates of the active variable categories exhibit consistently 
coherent ranking along the flexibility/choosiness axis; their numerical values are reasonably close across the various 
samples.   9
Second, the contribution of the variables to the first factor, as assessed mainly by the sum of 
absolute contributions of the relevant categories, is quite diversified. TIM, JOB and AVA dominate; 
REG plays a definitely lower, but still appreciable role; TYP,  PLA and WAG contribute very 
modestly. Thus, it appears that the choosiness of job-seekers ￿ as captured by the first factor of 
multiple correspondence analysis ￿ is characterized mainly in terms of selectivity with respect to 
working time regime, type of job, and immediate availability for work. However, for the purpose of 
constructing summary indicators of choosiness, we will use all seven active variables, suitably 
weighted, because TYP, PLA and WAG also exhibit the expected ranking along the first axis. 
A graphical representation is given in Figure 2, in which the categories of some 
supplementary variables ￿ gender, education, geographic area, labour force state ￿ are also 
projected  on to the  space generated  by the first two  factorial axes ￿  the flexibility/choosiness axis   
 
Table 4: Multiple correspondence analysis on job seekers, 1997.IV: selected results 
for first factor 










TYP     Typ1  -.25196  .00000  9  .00000 
     Typ2  .08669  .33865  3  4.22364 
AVA    Ava1 -.70582  .00000  104  .00000 
      Ava2  .37115  1.07697  47  182.98259 
      Ava3  .93762  1.64344  19  279.22867 
JOB      Job1 -.92584  .00000  190  .00000 
       Job2  .58566  1.51150  120  467.96493 
TIM     Tim1 -1.40430  .00000  255  .00000 
      Tim2  .22290  1.62720  12  566.41042 
     Tim3  .63222  2.03652  81  708.89021 
PLA      Pla1 -.45874  .00000 27  .00000 
      Pla2  .13391  .59265  8  20.78779 
WAG  Wag1 -.30112  .00000 16  .00000 
    Wag2  -.04694  .25418  0  9.60292 
    Wag3  .34984  .65096  22  24.59327 
REG    Reg1 -.21550  .00000 20  .00000 
     Reg2  .70765  .92315  67  80.38421 
     Proportion of variance explained by the first factor = 17.51%   10
 
being the horizontal one. Clearly, the categories of the supplementary variables are positioned, with 
respect to the first axis, consistently in accordance with expectations. Among job-seekers, women 
are more choosy than men; more educated people are more choosy than less educated ones; people 
from the relatively well-developed North of Italy are definitely more choosy than people from the 
South, comparatively less developed and with high unemployment; employed job seekers are 
positively more choosy than unemployed job losers and first job-seekers. Thus, the overall evidence 
from the positions  of the supplementary  variable categories  supports  the interpretation  of the first 
 
Figure 1:  Multiple correspondence analysis on job-seekers, 1997.IV: projection 





reg1  =  Registered at Labour Exchange Office 
reg2  =  Not registered at Labour Exchange Office 
wag1 =  Net monthly wage less than € 775 
wag2 =  Net monthly wage between  € 775 and 878 
wag3 =  Net monthly wage no less than € 878 
pla1  =  Everywhere 
pla2  =  Place of work in town of residence or any other town within commuting distance  
tim1  =  Any working time 
tim2  =  Preferably full-time or preferably part-time 
tim3  =  Only full-time or only part-time 
job1  =  Search actions (otherwise) 
job2  =  Search only for a job as employee in private sector 
ava1  =  Immediately available for work in any conditions 
ava2  =  Immediately available for work in adequate conditions 
ava3  =  Not immediately available for work 
typ1  =  Type of job (otherwise) 









-2,00000 -1,50000 -1,00000 -0,50000 0,00000 0,50000 1,00000 1,50000  11
 
Figure 2: Multiple correspondence analysis on job-seekers, 1997.IV: projection of categories of 
active and supplementary variables on first two factorial axes 
 
ED1 =  Elementary education (5 years) or less 
ED2 =  Compulsory (8 years) 
ED3 =  Upper secondary (11-13 years) 
ED4 =  University degree 
N      =  North 
C      =  Centre 
S      =  South 
M     =  Males 
F     =  Females 
EMP =  Employed 
UPE =  Unemployed, previously employed 
LFJ  =  Looking for a first job 
OSJ  =  Others seeking a job 
OLF =  Out of labour force 

































4.  Summary indicators of choosiness 
We move now to the construction of the indicator of choosiness, first at individual level and then, 
by aggregation, for the entire population of job-seekers or for convenient sub-sets of it.  
The first step consists of obtaining a concise indicator for single job-seekers, which 
summarizes the choosiness of their supply. For this purpose, we need to choose appropriately a 
metric for the categories of each variable and a weighting system for aggregating the variables.  
    Reasonable solutions are given:  
(a)  to the metric issue, by the translated factorial coordinates of the categories of a given variable j, 
the translation being such that the category associated with minimum choosiness takes on a 
value of zero; 
(b)  to the weighting issue, by adding up the absolute contributions of the various categories of each 
variable. The sum of the absolute contributions for variable j is used as the factorial weight for 
all the categories of that variable. 
These choices are intuitively convincing. In addition, defining the metric and the weighting system 
through MCA also has the advantage of minimizing discretion in the aggregation procedure. 
Furthermore, by using fixed weights for the various categories of a given variable, the ratios 
between the distances among categories, induced by the metric along the factorial axis, are 
preserved
21.  
The resulting indicator is then standardized by dividing it by its maximum admissible value. 
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where  j i l ,  are the translated factorial coordinates associated with the categories of variable j (j=1, 
..., 7) for individual i, and  j w  are the weights as defined in (b). Clearly, the range for  i C is [0,1]. 
When dealing with sample data, as in our case, we must attach a sample weight to each unit, 
in order to estimate the population (or sub-population distribution of the indicator or an aggregate 
(mean) indicator of that population. The corresponding weighted indicator for a generic set of N 
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where  i p  are the sample weights for individual i.   








= ∑ .                 ( 3 )  
The distribution of 
W
i C  among job-seekers in 1997.IV is shown in Figure 3, for the entire 
pool of job-seekers and separately by gender, geographic area, and detailed labour force state. 
                                                           
20 Note, on the contrary, that the interpretation of the second axis is problematic. Indeed, the categories of WAG (i.e., 
minimum net monthly wage) turn out to be well dispersed and consistently ordered from the first to the third, perhaps 
suggesting a dimension of ￿expected monetary reward￿. But the ranking of the categories of other active variables ￿ and 
also of the supplementary variables ￿ is difficult to explain.  
21 Alternatively, we could have used factorial weights, i.e., the (￿) absolute contributions of each category. This choice 
would have produced qualitatively similar but less polarized results, with a less straightforward interpretation.   13
  
Figure 3: Distribution by deciles (%) of the indicator of choosiness among job seekers, by 






































































































Although with non-negligible variations between groups, the distributions are quite well 
polarized: most of them are bimodal, U-shaped. About 50% of job-seekers are quite choosy, with 
W
i C ≥  .7, and with a sizeable spike mostly at .7≤
W
i C <.8.  Instead, the first part of the distribution 
tends to be more even, with a moderate spike at .0≤
W
i C <.1, identifying people who are not at all 
selective with respect to potential job offers. In short, with respect to the weighted individual   
indicator  of choosiness, the dominant pattern points to a clear distinction between two types of job-
seekers: highly and poorly choosy respectively. Interestingly enough, the spike on the latter type is 
more pronounced for men, in the South, and for unemployed job losers or looking for their first job. 
 
 
5. Stability and predictive power of the indicator 
 
5.1. Stability 
Before looking at the empirical results for Italy, it is worth examining the measurement properties 
of the individual indicator of choosiness, and of the observed survey variables used to construct it. 
Ideally, one would like to assess the reliability of these measures in an experimental setting, i.e., 
under invariance conditions as regards both the labour force state of the individual and other 
personal and environmental variables. Unfortunately, such data are not at our disposal.  
  A proxy for reliability analysis is provided by stability analysis, i.e., assessing the agreement 
of the measures over the same individuals, facing approximately the same labour force condition, in 
two subsequent survey occasions. Our 1997.IV-1998.I and 1997.IV-1998.IV panels fit this purpose. 
As pointed out in Section 2, they are confined to persons who, during the three-month and twelve-
month periods separating the two survey occasions, were continuously looking for a job. These ￿ 
indeed, only these ￿ sets of persons answered the questions on search/availability/preferences on 
both occasions.  
One point must be stressed. The mere fact that time passes destroys the coeteris paribus 
condition. It is reasonable to assume that people continuously looking for a job will become less 
choosy with time precisely because their spell of job search lengthens, the main explanation being 
that most job-seekers are liquidity-constrained
22. This is the main reason why our stability analysis 
is an approximation to proper reliability analysis. Conversely, under the assumption of choosiness 
declining with job search duration, our stability indicators should be viewed as lower limits to the 
true, unobservable reliability indicators. In other words, the measurement properties of the survey 
variables on search/availability/preferences for work, as well as of the individual indicators of 
choosiness, will be at least no worse than the corresponding stability properties assessed by 
empirical analysis over the panels of continuous job-seekers. 
  We also attempt to reduce the distance from the coeteris paribus condition by controlling for 
variations in the labour force state
23. In fact, a change in labour force state (for instance, from 
￿Unemployed, previously employed￿ to ￿Employed￿ looking for another job) is likely to induce 
some changes in the answers to our set of questions. To contain, at least partly, the perturbing 
effects of changes in conditions at the individual level, stability analysis  was carried out on 
convenient sub-sets of job-seekers characterised by different degrees of labour force state 
invariance. For this purpose, we considered various sets of job-seekers (their size is given in 
brackets for the quarterly panel): 
(I)  the sub-set of persons continuously employed (363); 
                                                           
22 The argument parallels the explanation for a declining reservation wage: see, e.g., Mortensen (1986), pp. 859-861. As 
will be seen in the sequel, this idea is consistent with our empirical findings.  
23 Within the ILFS, in principle it is possible to control for other factors of individual change (such as marital status, 
household size, labour force state of other household members, etc.), which are likely to affect the responses to survey 
questions on the search for work. However, this exercise would be quite cumbersome, and perhaps not rewarding 
because of poor short-term individual changes in those factors and sample size constraints.   15
(II)  the sub-set of persons continuously unemployed and previously employed (891); 
(III)  the sub-set of persons continuously looking for their first job (1,153); 
(IV)  the sub-set of persons continuously classified as ￿Others looking for a job￿ (353); 
(V)  the sub-set of unemployed persons continuously belonging to the same sub-group 
(II+III+IV: 2,397); 
(VI)  the sub-set of persons continuously unemployed, in a broad sense (2,654); 
(VII)  the sub-set of persons continuously out of the labour force (22); 
(VIII)  the sub-set of persons looking for a job who continuously belonged to the same sub-group 
(I+V+VII: 2,782); 
(IX)  the overall panel of persons continuously looking for a job, irrespective of their labour force 
state on the two survey occasions (3,223). 
Strict labour force state invariance holds for groups I-IV, VII and VIII. Suitable comparisons can 
also be made between group V, resulting from aggregation of the invariant sub-groups of 
continuously unemployed persons, and group VI, which comprises the overall set of persons 
continuously unemployed and thus is quite similar except for a lower degree of invariance; and, 
analogously, between groups VIII and IX.  
For both quarterly and yearly panels, for each of these sub-samples we assess the stability of 
results with reference to a two-way square table representing the cross-tabulation of the variable of 
interest on the two survey occasions. More precisely, we evaluate:  
(a)  The agreement of responses for each of the seven survey variables, measured by Cohen￿s κ  
statistic. Simply stated, Cohen￿s κ  is an index of the proportion of agreement above chance, 
with reference to a nominal classification. It is 0 when agreement equals that expected by 
chance, and is 1 when there is perfect agreement (see, e.g., Agresti, 1990, pp. 366-367).  
(b) The agreement of individual indicators of choosiness  i C
24, measured by three statistics: 
Cohen￿s κ , Weighted κ  
25, and the correlation coefficient. The latter coefficient exploits the 
continuous scale for  i C , the two former indices are computed from the 10x10 cross-tabulation 
of  i C by deciles.  
(c)  The change in choosiness moving from the first survey occasion to the second, for the sub-set 
of cases of non-agreement as revealed by the 10x10 cross-distribution of  i C by deciles. Let us 
consider only the frequencies outside the main diagonal, i.e., those associated with different 
measurements on the two survey occasions. Let us call the sum of relative frequencies above 
the main diagonal a, and the sum of relative frequencies below it b. A simple, convenient index 







.                 ( 4 )  
H  varies from ￿1 (all relevant frequencies below the main diagonal) to +1 (all relevant 
frequencies above it), 0 being the threshold discriminating downward from upward change
26. It 
is worth emphasizing that H is not an index of stability. Rather, it measures the direction of 
change, normalised in [￿1, +1] and, for proper interpretation, it must be assessed jointly with 
                                                           
24 We use  i C instead of 
W
i C , because we don￿t have weights for the panels. 
25 Weighted κ   is appropriate when categories are numerous and ordered, because in these circumstances the seriousness 
of any disagreement depends on the difference between ratings. (Also for nominal politomous classifications, some 
disagreements may be considered more substantial than others). Weighted κ   allows each cell i,j to be suitably weighted 
according to the seriousness of disagreement between the i-th and j-th categories, for i≠ j. We used the weights 
() 1 1 S S S S w R j i ij − − − = , where  i S  is the score for column i and R is the number of categories. The asymptotic 
variance of Cohen￿s κ   and that of Weighted κ   were computed according to Fleiss et al. (1969). 
26 H is indeterminate in the case of perfect agreement.   16
the corresponding indices of stability. Under the assumption of choosiness declining with 
search tenure, we anticipate that H will be negative and, coeteris paribus, will diminish as the 
ongoing spell of job search lengthens.  
    Results for the quarterly panel are shown in Tables 5 and 6 and are quite satisfactory. The 
main evidence may be summarized in a few statements. First, consistently with expectations, the 
change in choosiness is modest, but systematically downward (H around ￿.1). Also, the decrease in 
choosiness for continuously employed job-seekers is almost negligible (H = ￿.02) −  much lower in 
absolute terms than the decrease for the unemployed  (H = ￿.104 for those continuously in the same 
condition), which is also as expected. Second, stability is quite high, as appears from inspection of 
both Cohen￿s κ  for single variables entering the indicator of choosiness (systematically above .5, 
and above .7 in 40% of cases) and the three coefficients of agreement of the indicator of choosiness 
itself. Lastly, the closer the degree of labour force state invariance, the higher the stability. 
Comparison of the various coefficients for groups V vs. VI and groups VIII vs. IX does not reveal 
any violation of this pattern. 
 
Table 5:  Stability of responses to single variables entering indicator of choosiness, for people 
continuously looking for a job, from panel 1997.IV-1998.I (N=3,223): Cohen’s κ  for 
various subgroups of job-seekers 


















































a job  
.580 .513 .544 .687 .559 .546 .421 .561 .549 
(.061) (.037) (.029) (.045) (.021) (.020) (.164) (.019) (.018) 
TYP 
         
.758 .730 .731 .662 .731 .703  .749 .694 
(.040) (.023) (.020) (.047) (.014) (.014)  (.013) (.013) 
AVA 




.667 .649 .720 .715 .695 .677 .817 .702 .677 
(.051) (.026) (.020) (.038) (.015) (.014) (.124) (.014) (.013) 
JOB 
         
.716 .663 .733 .646 .696 .677 .687 .702 .677 
(.034) (.021) (.017) (.036) (.012) (.012) (.135) (.012) (.011) 
TIM 
         
.721 .690 .628 .648 .658 .639 .593 .665 .647 
(.047) (.031) (.025) (.058) (.018) (.018) (.200) (.017) (.016) 
PLA 
         
.723 .673 .650 .661 .662 .651 .777 .675 .660 
(.032) (.021) (.019) (.034) (.013) (.012) (.119) (.012) (.011) 
WAG 
         
.854 .766 .768 .841 .788 .774  1.000  .833 .806 
(.028) (.032) (.029) (.033) (.018) (.017) (.000) (.013) (.013) 
REG 
         
Sample size  363 891  1,153  353  2,397  2,654 22 2,782  3,223 
*   See Table 2 for variables description. 
** All observations in cell (3,3).   17
The results for the 1997.IV-1998.IV panel largely mimic previous ones (see Tables 7 and 8). 
Of course, some differences must be taken into account: a yearly panel of continuous job-seekers is 
more selected; the stability of responses to single survey variables ￿ and of the indicator of 
choosiness ￿ one year later is arguably lower. And this is precisely what we find. Apart from this, 
the decrease in choosiness of unemployed persons over one year is much higher than over a quarter 
(H = ￿.193 vs. ￿.104); stability remains reasonably high; the pattern of stability across sub-groups 
systematically favours groups which higher labour force invariance.  
The overall evidence from H  and the stability indices allows us to draw two broad 
conclusions: (i) the stability measures are lower limits for the reliability of the corresponding 
indicators; (ii) stability, and thus indirectly reliability, is remarkably high, and our results should be 
regarded as robust. 
 
Table 6:   Stability of indicator of choosiness for people continuously looking for a job from 
panel 1997.IV-1998.I (N=3,223) 
Coefficients of agreement 
[90% confidence intervals between brackets]
 Sample 
size 
Groups of persons 
continuously looking for 
a job   
Cohen￿s κ  Weighted  κ   Correlation 
coefficient 
Index H   
.644 .723 .782  -.020     363 
[.596; .692]  [.670; .776]  [.749; .815]     
I. Continuously  
Employed 
         
.557 .670 .743  -.076     891 
[.525; .588]  [.638; .703]  [.718; .768]     
II. Cont.ly  unemployed 
previously employed 
       
.609 .732 .796  -.110  1,153 
[.582; .636]  [.706; .757]  [.778; .814]     
III. Cont.ly looking for a 
first job 
       
.562 .686 .762  -.154     353 
[.512; .611]  [.638; .733]  [.725; .799]     
IV. Cont.ly others looking 
for a job 
         
.585 .706 .776  -.104  2,397 
[.566; .603]  [.687; .724]  [.763; .789]     
V. Unemployed cont.ly in 
the same condition 
(II+III+IV)         
.560 .685 .756  -.107  2,654 
[.541; .578]  [.667; .703]  [.742; .770]     
VI. Cont.ly unemployed: 
total 
         
.651 .708 .798  -.333      22 
[.458; .843]  [.527; .889]  [.671; .925]     
VII. Cont.ly out of labour 
force 
       
.600 .720 .789  -.096  2,782 
[.583; .617]  [.703; .737]  [.777; .801]     
VIII. Cont.ly in the same 
condition (I+V+VII) 
       
.559 .690 .764  -.093  3,223 
[.543; .576]  [.674; .706]  [.752; .776]     
IX. Cont.ly actively 
looking for a job 
       
   18
 
Table 7:  Stability of responses to single variables entering indicator of choosiness, for people 
continuously looking for a job from panel 1997.IV-1998.IV (N=1,592): Cohen’s κ   for 
various subgroups of job-seekers 


















































a job  
.596 .497 .477 .496 .491 .492  -  .498 .482 
(.100) (.056) (.041) (.074) (.030) (.028)    (.029) (.026) 
TYP 
         
.641 .656 .664 .517 .659 .641  -  .665 .601 
(.086) (.039) (.030) (.079) (.022) (.021)    (.021) (.019) 
AVA 
          
.794 .644 .676 .682 .667 .642  -  .680 .627 
(.081) (.039) (.029) (.060) (.022) (.021)    (.021) (.020) 
JOB 
         
.699 .552 .649 .638 .619 .586  -  .627 .567 
(.066) (.035) (.025) (.054) (.019) (.018)    (.018) (.017) 
TIM 
         
.670 .588 .556 .789 .597 .590  -  .603 .582 
(.096) (.053) (.035) (.072) (.027) (.025)    (.026) (.024) 
PLA 
         
.664 .587 .659 .631 .634 .610  -  .639 .600 
(.067) (.034) (.025) (.052) (.019) (.018)    (.018) (.017) 
WAG 
         
.892 .706 .683 .826 .719 .684  -  .772 .716 
(.047) (.055) (.048) (.059) (.032) (.031)    (.025) (.025) 
REG 
         
Sample size  94  384 638 158  1,180  1,352 2 1,276  1,592 
*   See Table 2 for variables description. 
**  Because of the small sample size we don￿t calculate Cohen￿s κ   for this subgroup.   19
Table 8:  Stability of indicator of choosiness for people continuously looking for a job from panel  
1997.IV-1998.IV (N=1,592) 
Coefficients of agreement 
[90% confidence intervals between brackets]
 Sample 
size 
Groups of persons 
continuously looking for 
a job  
Cohen￿s κ  Weighted  κ   Correlation 
coefficient 
Index H   
.602 .772 .889  .000     94 
[.506; .697]  [.696; .848]  [.854; .924]     
I. Continuously  
Employed 
         
.500 .612 .681  -.175   384 
[.452; .549]  [.560; .664]  [.636; .726]     
II. Cont.ly  unemployed 
previously  employed 
       
.537 .652 .710  -.253    638 
[.499; .574]  [.613; .692]  [.678; .742]     
III. Cont.ly looking for a 
first job 
       
.578 .669 .711  .018    158 
[.503; .652]  [.592; .747]  [.647; .775]     
IV. Cont.ly others 
looking for a job 
         
.531 .644 .704  -.193  1,180 
[.503; .558]  [.615; .673]  [.681; .727]     
V. Unemployed cont.ly 
in the same condition 
(II+III+IV)         
.499 .612 .673  -.147  1,352 
[.473; .525]  [.584; .640]  [.649; .697     
VI. Cont.ly unemployed: 
total 
         
- - -  -      2 
       
VII. Cont.ly out of labour 
force* 
       
.538 .659 .721  -.183  1,276 
[.512; .565]  [.631; .686]  [.699; .743]     
VIII. Cont.ly in the same 
condition (I+V+VII) 
       
.477 .599 .664  -.106  1,592 
[.453; .501]  [.573; .625]  [.641; .687]     
IX. Cont.ly actively 
looking for a job 
       
*  No results given because of the small sample size. 
 
5.2. Predictive power 
A different perspective for assessing the significance of the individual indicator of choosiness 
consists of looking at its predictive power in gross flows analyses. For this purpose, we restricted 
our attention to the sub-sets of the 1997.IV-1998.I and 1997.IV-1998.IV overall panels made up of 
unemployed persons on the initial survey occasion
27. They consisted of 4,370 and 3,879 persons, 
respectively. 
                                                           
27 To carry out gross flows analyses meaningfully, we had to condition to the initial state, discarding the additional 
requirement of continuous job search. We also excluded employed job-seekers, because their ￿transition probability￿ to 
employment cannot be given any reasonable interpretation. In fact, the flow comprises both stayers in the same job and 
movers to a different job. Job-seekers out of the labour force were excluded because there were too few of them.   20
We computed the probabilities of transition to the usual labour force states ￿ employment, 
unemployment, and out of the labour force ￿ conditional jointly on detailed unemployment 
condition (job losers, looking for a first job, others seeking a job) and on the level of the individual 
indicator of choosiness −  categorized as low, medium and high. Gross flows estimates were carried 
out for all the panel samples of initially unemployed, and for sub-groups resulting from breakdown 
by gender and geographic area. 
Table 9 shows that choosiness, as measured by our indicator and as categorized there, does 
not clearly affect quarterly transition probabilities from unemployment to employment. Indeed, in 
general  and  for  most  sub-groups, transitions  appeared  to  be  higher  for  persons with  higher 
choosiness. Instead, with minor exceptions, the lower the level of choosiness, the lower the 
probability of leaving the labour force. Less choosy persons show stronger attachment to the labour 
force, which essentially translates into a greater propensity to continue to search as unemployed. 
 
Table 9:  Quarterly transition probabilities (%) from unemployment by detailed condition, 
level of indicator of choosiness*, gender and geographic area: panel 1997.IV-1998.I 
(N=4,271) 
1997.IV   1998.I 
Males   Females  Total  Labour force 
state 
Indicator of 
choosiness  Empl. Unempl
. 
O.l.f. Empl.  Unempl. O.l.f.  Empl.  Unempl. O.l.f.
Italy 
Low  15.6 73.4  11.0  9.6  68.4  22.0 13.7  71.8 14.6 
Medium  19.3 69.1  11.6  11.9  70.2  17.9 16.0  69.6 14.4 
Unempl. 
Previously 
employed  High  17.9 64.2  17.9  11.3  68.0  20.7 14.4  66.2 19.4 
Low  4.8 85.2  9.9  4.8  80.3 14.9 4.8  82.8 12.4 
Medium  10.2 78.9  10.9  5.4  77.9  16.7  7.7  78.4 13.9 
Looking for 
the first job  
High  12.3 66.5  21.1  5.5  71.1  23.4  8.2  69.3 22.5 
Low  7.1 60.7 32.1  6.5  62.4 31.2 6.5  62.1 31.3 
Medium  7.7 56.4 35.9  5.1  61.7 33.2 5.4  61.0 33.5 
Others 
seeking  
 a job  High  11.4 59.1  29.5  4.4  58.6  37.1  5.4  58.6 35.9 
Low  10.3 78.3  11.3  6.5  72.3  21.2  8.5  75.4 16.1 
Medium  14.4 72.8  12.8  7.2  70.2  22.6 10.3  71.3 18.4 
T o t a l 
 
High  15.0 64.7  20.2  7.1  66.6  26.3 10.1  65.9 24.0 
North 
Low  13.5 73.0  13.5  11.5  71.6  16.9 12.2  72.2 15.6 
Medium  24.8 57.1  18.1  12.7  65.1  22.2 16.7  62.5 20.8 
Unemployed 
total 
High  27.0 53.3  19.7  10.9  61.9  27.2 16.4  59.0 24.7 
Centre 
Low  9.7 70.8 19.4  10.5  71.4 18.1  10.2 71.2 18.6 
Medium  18.8 71.3  10.0  12.9  60.6  26.5 15.1  64.6 20.3 
Unemployed 
total 
High  13.1 64.3  22.6  6.3  66.7  27.0  8.6  65.8 25.5 
South 
Low  9.9 80.1  9.9  3.8  72.7 23.5 7.3  76.9 15.8 
Medium  11.2 76.8  12.1  3.0  75.2  21.8  7.0  76.0 17.1 
Unemployed 
total 
High  9.6 70.6 19.8  5.0  69.6 25.5 6.8  70.0 23.2 
* Categories for indicator of choosiness: low = 0 ≤
W
i C  ≤  33.3 percentile; medium = 33.3 percentile <  
W
i C  <  66.7 
percentile; high = 66.7 percentile ≤
W
i C ≤  1.   21
The results for yearly transitions are qualitatively similar to those reported here
28. Overall, 
these findings are blurred, and seemingly ambiguous. When searching for a reasonable explanation, 
it is useful to consider the potential roles of heterogeneity and endogeneity. 
For better control of heterogeneity, and still in an exploratory vein, we proceeded to estimate 
some logit models, with the probability of transition to employment as the dependent variable and a 
fairly large set of predictors
29. In addition to the three-level indicator of choosiness, we included 
personal variables (among which unemployment duration), household variables, and regional 
proxies for local labour demand conditions
30. The summary evidence is that, net of these additional 
predictors, there is no significant effect of choosiness on the probabilities of transition to 
employment
31. By and large, our conclusions remain the same. Choosiness in itself does not appear 
to have any discernible impact on transition to employment, while it positively affects the 
probability of leaving the labour force.  
From a different perspective, it is sensible ￿ and revealing ￿ to conceive the level of 
choosiness to be endogenous to the search process. A convincing argument is provided by looking 
at the evidence above in the light of the theory of job search (see Mortensen, 1986, and Mortensen 
& Pissarides, 1999, for reviews), and loosely interpreting the individual indicator of choosiness as 
an analogue of the reservation wage. Under the assumption that both distribution of the number of 
offers received per period and wage offer distribution are known to the job-seeker, the level of 
choosiness is endogenously determined on the basis of the job-seeker￿s optimal search strategy. In 
this context, it might well be that differences in the various ingredients end up with highly choosy 
unemployed people having no lower, and sometimes higher, probabilities of transition to 




6.  Selected results for Italy and concluding comments 
 
6.1. Main results  
Some of the main results from the empirical analyses for Italy −  1997.IV, 1998.I and 1998.IV −  are 
shown in Tables 10-12. The mean indicator of choosiness, together with its standard error
33, is 
presented, with a breakdown by: 
(a) detailed labour force state and gender;   
(b) geographic area, and selected regions; 
(c) selected personal and household characteristics: age, education, marital status, household size, 
number of employed within the household, number of unemployed within the household, 
woman household head with children by their age. 
                                                           
28 They are available from the authors on request.   
29 Further breakdown of transition matrices was precluded by the modest sample size.  
30 More precisely, the variables ￿ with the number of categories in brackets ￿ were: gender, age (3), education (4), 
marital status (3), detailed unemployment condition (3), reported duration of search (3), household size (5), number of 
children within the household (2), number of employed within the household (2), number of other unemployed within 
the household (2), region (20) or geographic area (4). 
31 Detailed results are available from the authors on request. We again stress their exploratory nature. We did not 
attempt to control for unobserved heterogeneity. In addition, several predictors are endogenous to the labour market 
transitions to be explained.  
32 Note, incidentally, that similar findings on the dynamics of search behaviour are not so rare: see, e.g., Micklewright 
& Nagy (1999) for evidence from Hungary and Jones & Riddell (1999) for evidence from Canada. Analogous evidence 
was found also by Poterba and Summers (1995, p. 214), when analysing the impact of unemployment benefits on labour 
market transitions in the US: ￿The reservation wage variable does not exhibit any statistically significant  effects on 
labor market transition probabilities￿. 
33 The standard error was estimated by the bootstrap (Efron & Tibshirani, 1993), with 200 replications.    22
 
Table 10: Mean indicator of choosiness for groups of job-seekers by detailed labour force state and 
gender and geographic area:1997.IV, 1998.I and 1998.IV (weighted) 
1997.IV 1998.I  1998.IV  Aggregate 




Mean  (Standard  
error) 
Mean  (Standard 
error) 
Males            
Employed   .756  (.0071)  .752  (.0085)  .762  (.0074) 
Unemployed, previously employed  .536  (.0075)  .537  (.0074)  .535  (.0083) 
Looking for a first job  .516  (.0074)  .504  (.0075)  .498  (.0078) 
Others seeking a job  .595  (.0198)  .614  (.0188)  .637  (.0168) 
Unemployed total  .530  (.0051)  .526  (.0047)  .523  (.0056) 
Out of labour force  .718  (.0277)  .685  (.0313)  .702  (.0289) 
Total .577  (.0044)  .569  (.0042)  .572  (.0048) 
Females            
Employed   .764  (.0075)  .750  (.0081)  .753  (.0077) 
Unemployed, previously employed  .594  (.0072)  .613  (.0071)  .615  (.0069) 
Looking for a first job  .568  (.0067)  .554  (.0077)  .566  (.0067) 
Others seeking a job  .613  (.0069)  .621  (.0074)  .632  (.0062) 
Unemployed total  .589  (.0037)  .592  (.0043)  .600  (.0038) 
Out of labour force  .727  (.0251)  .697  (.0276)  .707  (.0210) 
Total .617  (.0035)  .616  (.0037)  .627  (.0034) 
Total            
Employed   .759  (.0051)  .751  (.0063)  .758  (.0056) 
Unemployed, previously employed  .561  (.0053)  .570  (.0051)  .569  (.0212) 
Looking for a first job  .542  (.0046)  .528  (.0054)  .532  (.0051) 
Others seeking a job  .610  (.0070)  .620  (.0068)  .633  (.0058) 
Unemployed total  .561  (.0031)  .560  (.0032)  .564  (.0034) 
Out of labour force  .722  (.0181)  .692  (.0208)  .705  (.0179) 
Total .597  (.0028)  .593  (.0027)  .601  (.0030) 
Selected regions* and 
geographic areas 
         
Veneto   .726  (.0116)  .729  (.0118)  .726  (.0108) 
Liguria   .560  (.0176)  .570  (.0159)  .602  (.0169) 
North .670  (.0048)  .659  (.0048)  .691  (.0050) 
Marche   .697  (.0165)  .737  (.0169)  .696  (.0176) 
Umbria   .587  (.0208)  .573  (.0236)  .591  (.0206) 
Centre .611  (.0068)  .620  (.0065)  .596  (.0069) 
Abruzzo   .630  (.0220)  .634  (.0200)  .642  (.0177) 
Campania   .538  (.0079)  .520  (.0079)  .515  (.0080) 
South .552  (.0039)  .548  (.0038)  .554  (.0042) 
* Within each geographic area, the two regions with the lower and higher mean indicators respectively are included.   23
When examining Tables 10 and 12, it should be recalled that our control for heterogeneity is 
mild: we are conditioning on a single variable at a time, except for the conditional distribution 
jointly by labour force state and gender. However, broadly speaking, it is fair to say that our results 
fit predictions by economic theory. The mean indicator of choosiness varies consistently with 
expectations across the labour force state and demographic characteristics of job-seekers, as well as 
across regions characterized by different labour market conditions. Our results are also quite 
informative, because those differences are appreciable, statistically significant. We draw attention to 
a few selected findings. 
Employed job-seekers are much more choosy than the unemployed ones (.76 vs. .56). The 
indicator of choosiness of job-seekers out of the labour force is relatively high, not far from that of 
the employed. Among the unemployed, people looking for a first job are definitely less choosy than 
job losers (and others seeking a job). Interestingly enough, this pattern is found both within men and 
women, and constantly across the three survey occasions.  
After controlling for labour force state, differences by gender are minor. The only noticeable 
evidence is among the unemployed. Unemployed women are more choosy than men: in total and 
within every single unemployment condition.  
Regional differences are apparent, and are inversely associated with the unemployment 
rate
34. The summary indicator is around .67 in the North (with a peak of .73 in the Veneto region) 
and around .55 in the South (down to .52 in the Naples region, Campania). Clearly, a composition 
effect is at work here, the unemployed ￿ particularly people looking for a first job ￿ being a larger 
fraction of job-seekers in less developed areas. To control for composition effects, we computed 
standardized regional indicators of choosiness. Standardization ￿ i.e., re-weighting relative to a 
target population ￿ was done by using as target population the Italian population distributed by 
gender, age group and detailed labour force state. Results are shown in Table 11, and should be 
compared with the corresponding, unstandardized indicators of choosiness shown in Table 12. The 
adjustments operated by standardization are as expected: for the North of Italy, the indicator of 
choosiness falls by .02-.03, whereas for the South it rises up by .02 (for the Naples region, up by 
about .03).  
 
Table 11:   Standardized mean indicator of choosiness by geographic area (target 
population Italy, jointly by gender, age group and detailed labour force 
state):1997.IV, 1998.I and 1998.I  
Selected regions* and geographic areas  1997.IV  1998.I  1998.IV 
Veneto    0.702 0.699 0.685 
Liguria    0.569 0.565 0.611 
North  0.647 0.631 0.665 
Marche    0.704 0.738 0.693 
Umbria    0.592 0.567 0.605 
Centre  0.609 0.616 0.591 
Abruzzo    0.630 0.636 0.640 
Campania    0.563 0.543 0.546 
South  0.569 0.566 0.574 
* Within each geographic area, the two regions with the lower and higher mean indicators respectively are 
included. 
                                                           
34 In 1997.IV, the unemployment rate was 6.4% in the North, 9.6 in the Centre and 21.5 in the South. It stayed quite 
stable over the subsequent year.    24
 
 
Table 12: Mean indicator of choosiness for groups of job-seekers by selected personal and 
household characteristics:1997.IV, 1998.I and 1998.IV (weighted) 
1997.IV 1998.I  1998.IV  Personal and household characteristics 








Age            
       15-29  .592  (.0036)  .584  (.0042)  .597  (.0037) 
       30-54  .611  (.0045)  .612  (.0043  .616  (.0045) 
       55 or more  .520  (.0175)  .512  (.0172)  .499  (.0194) 
Education            
       Elementary (5 years) or less  .547  (.0085)  .534  (.0083)  .544  (.0089) 
       Compulsory (8 years)  .576  (.0048)  .577  (.0045)  .575  (.0045) 
       Upper secondary (11-13 years)  .618  (.0044)  .614  (.0045)  .627  (.0040) 
       University degree  .680  (.0099)  .665  (.0099)  .681  (.0095) 
Marital status             
       Unmarried   .591  (.0036)  .580  (.0037)  .592  (.0038) 
       Married  .611  (.0047)  .617  (.0046)  .617  (.0051) 
       Separated, divorced or widow(er)  .586  (.0154)  .568  (.0164)  .610  (.0139) 
Household size             
       1  .603  (.0152)  .606  (.0166)  .628  (.0156) 
       2   .606  (.0086)  .599  (.0098)  .635  (.0077) 
       3  .613  (.0057)  .601  (.0055)  .613  (.0053) 
       4  .598  (.0050)  .603  (.0052)  .597  (.0046) 
       5 or more  .568  (.0071)  .560  (.0075)  .568  (.0064) 
Number of employed within the 
household 
         
       None  .536  (.0055)  .535  (.0056)  .535  (.0051) 
       1  .609  (.0041)  .600  (.0042)  .610  (.0044) 
       2  .646  (.0062)  .643  (.0070)  .655  (.0061) 
       3 or more  .692  (.0113)  .695  (.0127)  .692  (.0110) 
Number of unemployed within the 
household  
         
       None  .765  (.0064)  .753  (.0062)  .765  (.0056) 
       1  .587  (.0037)  .584  (.0038)  .588  (.0038) 
       2  .535  (.0073)  .532  (.0069)  .539  (.0061) 
       3 or more  .504  (.0116)  .513  (.0113)  .513  (.0133) 
Woman household head with 
children 
           
       Aged <  6 years   .656  (.0431)  .651  (.0450)  .687  (.0199) 
       Aged ≥  6 years   .609  (.0204)  .593  (.0181)  .621  (.0279) 
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On the whole, however, adjustments are relatively modest, and do not modify the picture 
outlined above. Regional differences in choosiness remain quite high. The standardized summary 
indicator ranges from around .55 for Campania to around .70 for Veneto. Otherwise stated, even 
after accounting for heterogeneity due to (most of the) composition discrepancies, job-seekers from 
a relatively well-developed North-Eastern region are still some 30% more choosy than their 
counterparts in a less developed region in the South. Essentially, these results point to the 
importance of local labour demand conditions in influencing both the unemployment rate and the 
choosiness of the pool of job-seekers.  
The distribution of the mean indicator of choosiness by personal and household 
characteristics of job-seekers is given in Table 12. As already pointed out, it is clearly affected by 
labour force (and other) composition effect; therefore, it should be interpreted with care. But some 
evidence still emerges clearly. As regards age, prime age persons are more choosy; by contrast, 
older job-seekers are less choosy. The ranking of the summary indicator is positively, and 
markedly, associated with level of education. Household composition, in terms of the number of 
employed or unemployed household members, entails clear variations in our summary indicator: it 
ranges from .53 when there is no employed person within the household to .89 when there are at 
least three persons employed; by contrast, it decreases from .76 to .51 when the number of   
unemployed persons moves from none to three or more. 
 
6.2. Opportunities and caveats  
Overall, the exercise of constructing summary indicators of choosiness of the supply of job-seekers 
seems to be promising, and opens up opportunities in various directions. 
The indicator of choosiness at the individual level is of some interest in itself. The empirical 
evidence for Italy points to a fairly clear-cut polarization of job-seekers into two groups: those 
(relatively) highly choosy and those poorly choosy. The implications for the labour market 
(dis)equilibrium process and for labour policies are, arguably, far from negligible. Besides, the 
individual indicator of choosiness may serve as a synthetic explanatory variable in job search 
models, when a variable reliably measuring the reservation wage is lacking.  
The aggregate (mean) indicator of choosiness may be used for comparisons across groups and 
over time, possibly by producing an appropriate index number. The results presented above for Italy 
exemplify some of these uses. Conversely, some caveats are in order. Apart from the usual 
warnings about using a ￿statistical￿ index number (e.g., problems in choosing and updating the base 
year), we should take into account for the fact that the number of unemployed varies from one 
survey occasion to another, and is affected by the well-known pro-cyclical behaviour of labour 
supply. The mean indicator provides us with a summary measure of the degree of choosiness of the 
set of persons currently unemployed (or, broadly, seeking a job). Thus, variations in the indicator 
over time will reflect the combined effect of changes both in choosiness itself −  as they are captured 
by variations in responses to job search questions −  and in the size and composition of the pool of 
unemployed (or, broadly, job-seekers).  
Appropriately, the mean indicator is useful for spatial comparisons, although some 
assumptions must hold ￿ and should be checked preliminarily. Basically, the measurement 
properties of the indicator should be more or less invariant across space. Now, typically 
measurement properties depend on measurement instruments −  the survey questions and how the 
questionnaire is administered ￿ and on their perception by respondents ￿ their cultural milieu. If this 
perception varies greatly, as may be the case across countries, it would be improper to use the 
indicator of choosiness strictly for cross-country comparisons. Rather, we should content ourselves 
with comparing, by appropriate index numbers, temporal variations in the indicator of choosiness 
across countries. 
   26
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